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There is a growing consensus among policy makers and international 
relations specialists that the western-led military mission in Afghanistan 
has reached an impasse. After eight years of conflict, the political, economic 
and military objectives of western states have yet to be achieved. The 
Taliban is inflicting major losses on NATO forces, and the most recent 
Presidential election was mired by fraud and corruption. Civilian casualties 
are rising, and there is a growing fear within NATO of replicating the Soviet 
failure in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration is currently 
debating a Pentagon request for tens of thousands of additional troops, 
public opinion in the US and other NATO countries is polling against both 
the current mission and the plans for a ‘surge.’ At the time of writing, it is 
unclear if the Obama administration will expand the war against the 
Taliban, or reconfigure the mission to focus more on aid and counter-
terrorism operations. 
 The current debate on Afghanistan in the US is not new for 
Canadians. Since 2005, Canada has been fighting a counterinsurgency war 
in Kandahar. Prior to that, Canada participated in the US-led Operation 
Enduring Freedom in 2001 and in NATO-led ISAF missions beginning in 
2003. Canada has spent tens of billions of dollars on a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach to nation building and counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan. This strategy has been implemented through a ‘Provincial 
Reconstruction Team’ in Kandahar, where the Department of National 
Defence (DND), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
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and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) jointly operate military, 
developmental and diplomatic projects. According to Moens (2008), this 
intervention has triggered a ‘revolution in Canadian foreign policy,’ most 
notably a rapid increase in defence spending, a militarization of Canadian 
security doctrine, and a new alignment with US foreign policy. Given these 
changes, the war in Afghanistan has become a flashpoint in Canadian 
politics and media. There is an ongoing public debate on the goals, 
methods, failures and achievements of Canada’s mission. 
This debate has also emerged in the social sciences. Starting in 
2007, there has been a proliferation of scholarship on Canadian foreign 
policy and the war in Afghanistan (e.g. Bell 2009; Nef and Robles 2008). 
This paper looks in detail at two important books by Stein and Lang (2007) 
and Warnock (2008). These books utilize different methods to examine the 
crisis in Afghanistan. The first is structured around a liberal theory of 
international relations and foreign policy decision-making, while the 
second is shaped by the methods of Marxism and critical political economy. 
These different approaches lead to very different assessments of the 
mission and to opposite conclusions on how Canada should proceed. While 
the former lends itself to a strategy of tactical reorganization, the latter 
marks out an anti-occupation position.  
Unexpected War by Stein and Lang offers a detailed narrative of 
Canada’s role in Afghanistan since 2001. The book is structured around a 
series of interviews with Canadian policy makers such as Paul Martin, John 
McCallum and Bill Graham, who were key decision-makers in the early 
stages of the war and in the lead up to Canada’s relocation to Kandahar. 
Based upon these interviews, the book presents an inside account of the 
conflict. 
The narrative is highly engaging. Stein and Lang reveal the internal 
confusions of the Chretien and Martin governments, the fierce competition 
between DFAIT and DND, the extraordinary influence of General Rick 
Hillier, and the outside pressures of the Bush administration. According to 
the authors, it is this mix of government uncertainty, bureaucratic 
infighting, personality politics, and external influence that shaped and 
directed Canada’s role in Afghanistan. 
The book’s discussion of Operation Apollo in 2001, for example, 
reveals a welter of contradictions inside the state. While Canada offered 
naval units and JTF2 commandos to the US-led Operation Enduring 
Freedom, cabinet decisions were made on the assumption of an ‘early in, 
early out’ scenario. The DND, however, viewed the emerging ‘war on 
terrorism’ as a new opportunity for both re-equipping the military and 
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redefining Canadian foreign policy. To this end, Canadian officers based at 
US Central Command in Tampa Bay, Florida, passed on requests from US 
military personnel for a combat deployment in 2002. Cabinet approved 
this deployment, which committed 800 combat troops to Kandahar on a 
stabilization mission, even though the request for this mission emerged 
outside the normal channels of inter-state diplomacy. 
As the authors reveal, this was not the only time that DND officials 
engaged in mission prodding. In Summer 2002, DND officials briefed 
cabinet members on the merits of extending the mission in Kandahar 
instead of joining the ISAF operation in Kabul. This briefing was presented 
as a tip-off on a forthcoming US request to stay in Kandahar. However, 
when Minister of Defence John McCallum visited Washington in January 
2003, Donald Rumsfeld requested Canada’s leadership of ISAF. McCallum 
and Rumsfeld struck an informal agreement: Canada would not join the US 
in Iraq, but would instead command the ISAF/NATO mission in Kabul. The 
tacit agreement was that Canada would oversee and manage the Afghan 
theater as American forces left for the Gulf. Canada’s role in ISAF would 
also be to mediate any potential conflicts with Europe. 
For Stein and Lang, Canada’s role in Afghanistan became less clear 
in December 2003 after Paul Martin assumed the Prime Ministership. 
Martin viewed the mission as a legacy of Chretien and was more interested 
in charting his own course in ‘failed states’ such as Darfur and Haiti. 
However, after ruling out a Canadian role in BMD, a consensus emerged in 
cabinet, DFAIT and DND to make a recommitment to Afghanistan. As 
compensation to the Americans, Canada would participate in the NATO 
effort to expand PRTs throughout the country. These PRTs would combine 
defence, developmental and diplomatic functions in a single setting, and 
test the ‘3D’ strategy of the International Policy Statement, Canada’s new 
foreign policy doctrine. Unfortunately, the delay in making this decision 
left Canada with only one option for deployment: Kandahar. In a ‘classic 
case of bureaucratic dithering and bickering’ (134), Canada was forced to 
establish a PRT in the Taliban homeland. 
Canada’s PRT was designed around four elements: the deployment 
of 1,000 infantry and JTF2 commandos to Kandahar; a command 
responsibility over Kandahar multinational headquarters; the 
implementation of aid and development projects through CIDA; and the 
establishment of a ‘Strategic Advisory Team’ within the Presidential Office 
of Hamid Karzai. The goal of the PRT was to stabilize Kandahar militarily in 
order for aid and development projects to succeed. The Canadian mission 
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was expected to end in 2007, after which Canada would assist in ‘troubled 
spots’ such as Darfur or Palestine. 
As Bill Graham recalls, ‘We were probably drinking too much of our 
own bathwater’ (186). Despite gung-ho rhetoric from military officials, 
Canada was unprepared for the conflict that ensued. Canada ignored 
intelligence on the growing strength of the Taliban insurgency, took few 
precautions in turning over detainees to torture in Afghan jails, utilized 
counterinsurgency methods that alienated the population, and allocated 
funds for military purposes at a level ten times higher than that for 
development. Despite these trends, the Conservative government of 
Stephen Harper claimed ownership of the war and succeeded twice in 
extending the mission with Liberal support. 
Stein and Lang close their book with a critical assessment of 
Canada’s ‘unexpected war.’ First, they identify key contradictions in the 3D 
strategy, in particular, the bureaucratic rivalries between DND, DFAIT and 
CIDA. Second, they highlight continental relations as the primary concern 
of policy makers: 
The Canada-U.S. relationship framed every major recommendation that 
Canada’s military leaders made to their minister. Afghanistan was never the 
subject but only the object, the terrain in which the Canadian Forces operated 
as they struggled with an assertive Bush administration. Afghanistan could have 
been anywhere. It was no more than a spot on the map (262). 
Nevertheless, Stein and Lang argue for a mission extension. They 
acknowledge ongoing problems of warlordism, corruption, civilian 
casualties and torture, yet argue that Canada must stay the course to 
support a UN-sanctioned mission, to preserve NATO as an alliance, to 
‘build schools and clinics,’ to enhance democracy and women’s rights, and 
to prevent civil war and terrorism. To meet these challenges, Canada must 
‘reconfigure its military and its development assistance program, as well as 
the way its departments work together outside Canada’ (297). Political 
leaders must ‘speak clearly to the public’ and explain why ‘we are there for 
a generation’ (297). 
For Stein and Lang, this commitment is warranted as a positive 
example of liberal internationalism: 
When Canada commits to rescue failed and failing states, its political leaders 
are asking for an extraordinary act of imagination, one that asks Canadians to 
accept that they share a common fate, a destiny, with people who live halfway 
around the globe. Those in Britain who led the anti-slavery movement in the 
nineteenth century made this heroic leap, and saw their own humanity bound 
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with the humanity of slaves. When Canadian soldiers go to Kandahar – or to 
Darfur or to Haiti – Canadians must be able to make this same leap (302). 
To emphasize their point, Stein and Lang end their book with a quote from 
an Afghan named Farid, who told John Manley that, ‘Afghanistan is your 
child. If you do not support a child, teaching it how to walk, it cannot stand 
on its own two feet. Afghanistan is your child’ (304). Through such 
metaphors, Stein and Lang stake their case for a generation-long war. 
 This paternalistic conclusion is one of many problems. For example, 
the liberal methodology of interviewing key decision-makers has mixed 
results. On the one hand, it offers a unique understanding of personality 
politics inside the state. On the other hand, the interview material is not 
compared to other evidence on the background to the conflict, the 
motivations of western policy in Central Asia, and the course of events in 
Afghanistan since 2001. The liberal approach is idealist in that it focuses on 
ideas of individuals in power as the main determinant of foreign policy. Left 
out of the analysis are material factors such as geopolitical rivalries, 
economic interests, and the history of western foreign policy. The authors 
ignore these structural variables and instead develop their narrative 
largely on the basis of interviews with powerful politicians. The final 
product, while informative in many respects, offers little more than a ‘great 
leader’ understanding of the conflict. 
 The book is also limited by an uncritical acceptance of the ‘war on 
terror.’ Not mentioned is the history of US intervention in Afghanistan 
since 1978, when the Carter administration first provided funds to the 
mujahideen. The authors also leave aside the connection between 9/11 
and the history of US foreign policy in the Middle East, as well as the 
political motivations of al-Qaeda (Mohamedou 2006). The historical 
narrative is also quite narrow, and ignores the civil war period of 1992-
1996 and the crimes committed at the time by our current allies in 
Afghanistan. More importantly, there is little information on the wider 
context of state building and reconstruction in Afghanistan since 2001. Left 
out, or glossed over, are troubling issues such as the external manipulation 
of state-building assemblies in 2001 and 2002; the reconstitution of the 
Northern Alliance militias; the repression of women’s rights by 
fundamentalists in the new Afghan Parliament; the growing restrictions on 
civil liberties; the imposition of an externally-devised neoliberal 
development plan; the manipulation of aid as a weapon of 
counterinsurgency; the sectarianism of the occupation; the Karzai 
government’s role in drug production and distribution; and the systematic 
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use of torture by American and Afghan forces (Kolhatkar and Ingalls 2006; 
Johnson and Leslie 2008; Rashid 2008). As a result, the book does not 
make a convincing argument for mission extension. 
 Lastly, there is a problem with the notion of ‘unexpected war.’ A 
comparative analysis of Canadian foreign policy might show similarity 
between Canada’s current role in Afghanistan and its recent roles in Haiti, 
Iraq, Serbia and Somalia. Each of these cases demonstrates a militarization 
of Canadian foreign policy, an alignment with American objectives, a 
commitment to neoliberal economics, and an opposition to popular 
governments and insurgencies. In the field of international political 
economy, these conflicts are often viewed as part of a single war against 
the Global South.1 Given Canada’s rank and position in the capitalist world 
system, it is hardly surprising that Canada has been engaged in a military 
occupation of Afghanistan, a coup d’etat in Haiti, and constant war in the 
Middle East. These are the primary fronts of the ‘new imperialism’ (Harvey 
2003), in which Canada plays a rather consistent and considerable role. For 
this reason, the theory of ‘unexpected war’ is not the best guide for 
mapping Canada’s role in Afghanistan. 
 Creating a Failed State by John W. Warnock offers such a map. 
Warnock argues that western foreign policy before and after 9/11 created 
the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan. The evidence for his book is drawn from 
a systematic survey of recent scholarship on American foreign policy, 
Afghan history, and global political economy. The book also references key 
reports by think tanks and human rights organizations based in 
Afghanistan and the west. As a result, the book offers a convincing 
framework and set of evidence. It begins with the war in 2001, which killed 
up to 3,400 Afghans (16). Warnock recapitulates the story of how the US 
employed the militias of the Northern Alliance, whose ‘boots on the 
ground’ complimented US air power (12-13). He also covers the offers of 
negotiation by the Taliban and the violations of international law by US 
and NATO forces. 
 Warnock investigates ‘failed states’ discourse as a pretext for 
western intervention. States such as Afghanistan and Haiti are ‘failures’ not 
because they have been ignored by western powers, but because of 
economic and military domination by western powers. Warnock 
demonstrates how the current failure of the Afghan state results, in part, 
from an externally driven, free-market development agenda of 
privatization, liberalization and government austerity. Warnock also 
                                                 
1
 I need to thank Adam Hanieh for this formulation of a ‘single war.’ 
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critiques the role of NGOs, which created a property bubble in Kabul and 
pursued development plans outside the reach and influence of the state. 
 After setting this framework, Warnock reviews the history of 
Afghanistan. He examines the social structure of the country, the 
movement towards liberal democracy across the twentieth century 
(particularly in the 1960s during the ‘New Democracy’ movement), and the 
rise of the urban left and communist parties. The 1979 Soviet invasion is 
described as an attempt to leverage control in Central Asia and to stop the 
feuding amongst Afghan communists. Warnock emphasizes, however, that 
US aid to the mujahideen began prior to the Soviet invasion. Over the 
period of a decade, the US provided more than $7 billion through CIA 
channels. This aid was used to fund the military activities of Afghan 
mujahideen and foreign fighters. More than one million Afghans were 
killed in the war, and the state and national infrastructure destroyed. After 
the fall of the Soviet-backed government in 1992, the mujahideen fought a 
civil war for control of the country. Thousands more died in this conflict, 
which only ended after the Taliban imposed order on most of the country 
in 1996. 
 It would be mistaken to ignore the geopolitical interests of the 
United States in the Middle East and Central Asia. Warnock describes how 
US foreign policy since the Cold War has been to maintain hegemony in the 
context of growing competition from Europe and Asia. The United States 
has articulated a new military strategy based on ‘preventative warfare,’ 
and has begun the process of encircling China and Russia with military 
bases. In the context of shifting power relations in the world economy, the 
energy resources of the Middle East and Caspian Sea basin have been 
imbued with new significance. The western strategy is to maintain 
leverage over hydrocarbon distribution networks in the Middle East and 
Central Asia, so as to limit or shape the development paths of China, Russia 
and other competitors. Warnock suggests that the decision to wage war in 
Afghanistan was likely made in the summer of 2001, when the ‘Six plus 
Two’ negotiations involving the US, Russia and the six neighbouring 
countries of Afghanistan failed to gain agreement from the Taliban for a 
power-sharing deal with the Northern Alliance and a new pipeline in the 
country (83). Whether or not this claim is true, Warnock makes a strong 
point on the geopolitical and economic conflicts at the heart of the war. In 
his view, the war is inextricably linked to the agenda of western 
imperialism: the effort to expand NATO into new territories, gaining 
control over key resources, and preventative action against China and 
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Russia. The war, in other words, is a conflict over power and resources in 
Asia and the wider world system. 
 After establishing this framework, Warnock turns to the occupation 
of Afghanistan, depicting the violence and corruption at the centre of the 
state since 2001. He describes the way in which the Bonn Process imposed 
a highly centralized Presidential system under the control of Hamid Karzai, 
whose main base of support was the militias and religious fundamentalists 
of the Northern Alliance. Warnock describes how the new Afghan 
constitution and the Political Parties Law restricted the role of secular, 
democratic parties in elections and Parliament. He also demonstrates how 
Karzai incorporated factional warlords into the highest echelons of the 
state, and supported policies that limit the rights of women (126). He 
emphasizes that: 
the reversal of the general trend towards the liberation of women began when 
the US government gave massive economic and military aid to the Islamist 
mujahideen rebellion between 1978 and 1992. They expressed no concern for 
the plight of women during the Islamist Rabbani government from 1992 to 
1996. They supported the Taliban until 2001, hoping that they could provide a 
stable government and allow the construction of the oil and gas pipelines from 
the Caspian Sea basin to the Arabian Sea. Only when this joint effort with the 
Unocal consortium failed…did they show any concern for the status of Afghan 
women (149). 
Warnock dedicates one chapter to Canada’s role in Afghanistan. Canada 
supported the Bonn Process of establishing a client state, and played an 
instrumental role in facilitating NATO’s entry into the conflict. Canada 
expanded operations in Afghanistan in order to replace US forces leaving 
for Iraq, and worked at the centre of the Afghan state through a ‘Strategic 
Advisory Team.’ Canadian aid policies have had little effect on 
development and reconstruction, and Canadian Forces have been 
implicated in civilian casualties and the transfer of detainees to torture. 
The war in Afghanistan thus marks a complete ‘integration and 
subordination’ of Canadian foreign policy to US empire-building (171). 
 According to Warnock, the solution for Afghanistan is not an 
increase of foreign forces or a redoubled aid and humanitarian effort in 
support of the occupation. Instead, what is needed is a ‘broad peace 
settlement that includes the countries that neighbour Afghanistan’ (176). 
In other words, Canada must support a withdrawal of foreign troops in 
conjunction with an international peace agreement between Pakistan, 
Russia, Iran, India, the Central Asian states, and key stakeholders in 
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Afghanistan, including the Taliban. Canada must support democratic and 
secular parties in Afghanistan, and reject ‘the neoliberal development plan 
imposed on [the country]’ (179). To achieve these goals, the Canadian left 
must reinvigorate the anti-war and global justice movements and build 
support for an ‘independent foreign and defence policy’ in Ottawa (185). 
While Canada ‘share[s] the responsibility for the tragic situation that exists 
today in Afghanistan,’ it can still effect positive change through peaceful 
development efforts (186, 183). Through such methods Canada can work 
against the logic of state failure. 
 In making these arguments, Creating a Failed State offers a 
counterpoint to Unexpected War. It is framed by the insights of Marxist 
political economy and thus considers a wider set of variables for explaining 
the war and occupation. Yet it shares one key weakness: the theorization of 
Canada as a dependency of the United States. There is a tendency in both 
books to overlook Canada’s independent interests in the new imperialism. 
While Canada is highly integrated economically with the United States, 
recent scholarship has established the independent set of economic 
relations through which Canada articulates to Europe, Asia and 
increasingly the Third World (Klassen 2009). Foreign control of has 
declined since the 1970s, and Canadian MNCs have expanded into North 
America and Europe. Recent studies of directorship interlocks also indicate 
the existence of an independent corporate elite with effective control over 
the national economy (Carroll 2004; Carroll and Klassen 2010). In this 
context, it would be an analytic mistake for the left to view US-Canada 
relations solely in terms of dependency, and a political mistake to advocate 
‘independence’ in matters of foreign policy, when such independence 
would merely express the singular interests of Canadian capital and the 
state it controls. As many in the global justice and anti-war movements 
argue, any movement against capitalism and war must address Canada’s 
own brand of secondary power imperialism. By locating the impetus to 
war and militarism not just in Washington but also in the boardrooms of 
corporate Canada, it might be possible to devise more effective strategies 
of international solidarity. At the very least, such an analysis would orient 
the left towards a structural critique of Canadian capitalism and a socialist 
or anti-capitalist politics. In the long term, this kind of consciousness and 
organization will have to be nurtured to avoid wars of empire. In the 
meantime, John Warnock’s Creating a Failed State offers a good point of 
departure. 
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